

VZCZCXRO0193  
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV  
DE RUEHKH #2048/01 3611158  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
O 271158Z DEC 07  
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9618  
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE  
RHMFISS/CJTJF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002048

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE  
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS  
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: N/A  
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [SOCI](#) [AU](#) [SU](#) [UNSC](#)  
SUBJECT: HSP DELAYS REQUIRE LEADERSHIP

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) officials must rapidly address key issues required for ensuring that the Chinese and Bangladeshi HSP units become operational. While there will always be some excuse for delay, the units have the equipment necessary to do their jobs in the immediate term; the only thing lacking is the leadership to make them go out and do it. At its current pace, the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) will have little to show for itself on January 1 and may have difficulty absorbing additional troops given delays in construction of the "supercamp." END SUMMARY.

"THEY ALREADY HAVE WHAT THEY NEED"

¶2. (SBU) Based on a December 22 conversation between FieldOff and UNAMID Chief of Integrated Support Services (CISS), the UN estimates that the Chinese engineering unit of the HSP could start work in Nyala using the equipment it presently possesses. According to the CISS, the advance party of Chinese engineers currently in Nyala has equipment, vehicles and camp support stocks sufficient to manage operations until its heavy equipment - which consists of one grader and one bulldozer - arrives. This equipment, traveling over land via commercial contractor, was supposed to have reached Nyala ten days ago.

¶3. (SBU) The CISS said that equipment deficits are merely an excuse for Chinese inactivity, rather than the bona fide cause of it. He attributed the failure of the Chinese unit to execute its mandate to several factors. First, he noted the Chinese contingent commander's (understandable) insistence on area protection for the unit's movements between the PAE Forward Operating Base where it is lodged and the site of the "supercamp" it is to construct (called the "Green Field").

¶4. (SBU) The Nigerian battalion that would provide this area protection presents a second problem, according to the CISS. These troops claim they are insufficiently equipped to provide proper protection, but the CISS insists they are not short of anything which "isn't already in PAE stores" (including tents and radios) and which could not have been provided to them by AMIS. The CISS noted there is a general reluctance to be "the first to the Green Field" among elements intended to deploy there. He alleged that this sentiment is shared by the Bangladeshi Formed Police Unit (FPU) in Nyala, which despite lacking only one APC, a water truck and some small equipment, refuses to deploy before the Chinese "test the waters."

¶5. (SBU) The final problem, according to the CISS, comes from the absence of an Operational Order instructing the Chinese and Bangladeshis to move. The CISS noted that this should be a routine, two-day process: the Force Commander (FC) should issue the order, it should be co-signed by the Police Commissioner, and then issued to the Nigerian battalion, the Chinese engineers and the Bangladeshi FPU. Issuance of this order, however, has been complicated by what the CISS characterizes as a "debate" among the various command and

control structures at play. Because the Chinese and Bangladeshi units are part of the Heavy Support Package, they technically fall under the authority of the UNMIS FC, vice the AMIS/UNAMID FC. He said this has created friction across the chains of command and resulted in delays. The CISS reports that similar tensions exist between the AMIS Sector South Commander and the Chinese contingent commander. The CISS predicted that none of these players, especially the "multi-hatted Force Commander," will move on getting those units deployed before January 1.

AMIS DEPUTY FC: NO DEPLOYMENT PLAN

-----

¶16. (SBU) The lack of a deployment plan is another factor delaying deployment of these units. The UNAMID Deputy Force Commander told FieldOff December 22 that the UNAMID deployment plan was a prerequisite for issuance of any Operational Order. He said the original plan submitted to UN Headquarters in New York must be revised to reflect the re-structuring of the area of operations from eight to three sectors. The Deputy FC confessed that this revised plan has not yet been re-submitted to New York for authorization and is not likely to be submitted until after January 1, when the UNAMID Chief of Operations and FC are back in El Fasher. The Deputy FC insisted that UNAMID leadership will not wait for the entire deployment plan to be approved before implementing priority parts of it, but noted that nothing will start until the Chinese are fully equipped and staffed. He said he did not expect the Chinese to begin work in earnest until March 2008.

¶17. (SBU) The Deputy FC opined that area protection should not be an obstacle to Chinese deployment. He said such protection need not be more sophisticated than an infantry battalion cordoning off the Chinese area of operations, and he assured FieldOff that the Nigerians are ready and able now to carry out this task.

¶18. (SBU) COMMENT: With the Force Commander absent from El Fasher,

KHARTOUM 00002048 002 OF 002

the types of decisions required to move deployment forward will not be made until sometime in January or later. The FC did not chair a planned December 22 AMIS-UNAMID meeting on transition due to a late return from his U.S. visit. He is now in Addis Ababa and is expected to return in early January. The FC is the last word on every document that authorizes the steps involved in deployment - from finalizing the deployment plan to signing off on the operational orders. Leadership is required to ensure that UNAMID actually deploys the assets it currently has at its disposal. At its current pace UNAMID will have little to show for itself on January 1, and will be hard pressed to be able to absorb additional troops before March due to delays in construction of the supercamp.

¶19. (SBU) Tripoli minimize considered.

POWERS